We present a logic for the reasoning about necessity and justifications which is independent from relational semantics. We choose the concept of justification -coming from a class of Justification Logics (Artemov 2008 , Fitting 2009 ) -as the primitive notion on which the concept of necessity is based. Our axiomatization extends Suszko's non-Fregean logic SCI (Brown, Suszko 1972) by basic axioms from Justification Logic, axioms for quantification over propositions and over justifications, and some further principles. The core axiom is: ϕ is necessarily true iff there is a justification for ϕ. That is, necessity is first-order definable by means of justifications. Instead of defining purely algebraic models in the style of (Brown, Suszko 1972) we extend the semantics investigated in (Lewitzka 2012) by some algebraic structure for dealing with justifications and prove soundness and completeness of our deductive system. Moreover, we are able to restore the modal logic principle of Necessitation if we add the axiom schema ϕ → ϕ and a rule of Axiom Necessitation to our system. As a main result, we show that the modal logics S4 and S5 can be captured by our semantics if we impose the corresponding modal logic principles as additional semantic constraints. This will follow from proof-theoretic considerations and from our completeness theorems. For the system S4 we present also a purely model-theoretic proof.
Introduction
In an earlier paper [12] we presented an epistemic non-Fregean logic, called ∈ K , which is independent of relational semantics and models knowledge and common knowledge avoiding all forms of the problem of logical omniscience. Formulas are interpreted as elements of a given model-theoretic universe M = T RU E ∪ F ALSE of true and false propositions. 1 Knowledge of an agent i is explicitly given as a set of true propositions T RU E i ⊆ T RU E ⊂ M . In general, the set T RU E i is not closed under rules of inference. Nevertheless, imposing specific constraints on the model-theoretic semantics, it can be closed under logical connectives, Modus Ponens (via a semantic counterpart of axiom K), positive and/or negative introspection, etc. That is, many standard epistemic principles can be restored and the reasoning capabilities of an agent may vary from completely ignorant to omniscient. The modal logic principle of Necessitation, however, is not investigated in [12] . A further question arising from [12] is that for an intuitive explanation or justification for knowledge. While (implicit) knowledge in modal epistemic logics derives in a rather intuitive way from the underlying possible worlds scenario (ϕ is known iff ϕ is true in all accessible worlds), knowledge in logic ∈ K is given a priori as a set of propositions without any reasons provided by the semantics. We enrich here the approach developed in [12] by the intuitive (though abstract) concept of justification coming from a class of Justification Logics which evolved from the Logic of Proofs introduced by Artemov [1, 2] . The notions of necessity/knowledge then are based on the primitive concept of justification. In fact, by introducing quantification over justifications we are able to define necessity/knowledge by means of a first-order existential formula. Justification logics are classical propositional logics augmented with justification assertions of the form t : ϕ which read as "t is a justification for ϕ". In an epistemic framework, such an assertion reads as "ϕ is known for the explicit reason t". Under this interpretation, justification logics can be seen as logics of explicit knowledge addressing the problem of logical omniscience in a new way. Moreover, justification assertions turn epistemic logic more expressive and allow for a deeper epistemic analysis. For a detailed overview we refer the reader to [3, 9, 5] . The standard relational semantics for Justification Logic was developed by Fitting [8] . In this paper, we apply only a few basic principles of classical Justification Logic and deviate from some others (for instance, we will work with a different rule of Axiom Necessitation). The basic principles that we adopt here are given by the following axiom schemas where · and + are operations on justification terms:
• s : (ϕ → ψ) → (t : ϕ → (s · t) : ψ) (application)
• s : ϕ → (s + t) : ϕ (weakening)
• t : ϕ → (s + t) : ϕ (weakening)
We present a Hilbert-style deductive system (with Modus Ponens as the only rule) which contains the above given axioms and extends Suszko's basic nonFregean logic SCI, the Sentential Calculus with Identity [7] , by quantification over propositions and quantification over justifications (or reasons), a total truth predicate, a connective for propositional reference, and a partial ordering on justifications. We define a semantics which extends the semantics studied in [14] by some algebraic machinery for dealing with justifications. This style of non-Fregean semantics goes back to Sträter who designed ∈ T -Logic [17] as a first-order logic for the reasoning about propositional truth and propositional self-reference. ∈ TLogic does not involve inconsistencies despite of its total truth predicate and its capability to assert self-referential statements without restrictions. The Tarski biconditionals (Tarski's T-schema) hold and can be expressed in the object language (see, e.g., [14, 13] for a discussion). The axiomatization of ∈ T -Logic given by Zeitz [18] can be seen as an extension of the axiomatization of Suszko's SCI. 2 Our Hilbert-style deductive system extends ∈ T -Logic and therefore also SCI. On the other hand, ∈ T -style semantics (which we will apply in this paper) differs essentially from the algebraic semantics given for SCI (see [7] ). The algebraic structure of an ∈ T -model is not explicitly given by operations on a propositional universe but is imposed by the truth conditions and the structural properties of the semantic assignment function (called Gamma-function) of a model. In [12] it is shown that (in a quantifier-free setting) ∈ T -style semantics is equivalent with the algebraic semantics in the style of Bloom/Suszko. An advantage of ∈ T -style semantics is that models do not carry all the algebraic structure which is already implicitly given by the Gamma-function and the structure of the object language.
Our logic has all the expressive power of the ∈ T -logic presented in [14] . In particular, we may assert self-referential statements such as truth tellers, liars, contingent liars, etc. but also self-referential epistemic propositions in the object language. For instance, the equation d 1 ≡ d 1 asserts that constant d 1 denotes the proposition "I am necessarily true". Similarly, d 2 ≡ t : d 2 asserts that d 2 denotes the proposition "I am true for the explicit reason t". There exist models satisfying these equations. Equations such as d 3 ≡ (d 3 : f alse) asserting a paradoxical statement can be formulated in the language but they are unsatisfiable. The fact that the liar proposition does not exist is expressed by the theorem ¬∃x.x ≡ (x : f alse). The symbol : in a formula ϕ : true or ϕ : f alse can be read as "is element of". Thus, ϕ : f alse reads as "the proposition denoted by ϕ is an element of the set of false propositions", or simply: "ϕ is false". Further properties of propositions can be expressed in a similar way. In [12] we have expressed knowledge of agents in this way, and the logic presented in [13] has formulas of the form ϕ : valid expressing that ϕ belongs to the set of valid formulas. 3 Taking into account the axiom (t : ϕ) → ϕ from Justification Logic, together with the Tarski biconditionals ϕ ↔ (ϕ : true), it follows that a justification is given by a set of true propositions REASON t ⊆ T RU E. If REASON t is the set of true propositions assigned to the justification term t, then we put N ECESSARY := t∈T m(C) REASON t , where T m(C) is the set of all justification terms over the set of constant symbols C. N ECESSARY is the set of all propositions which are necessarily true in the model, and this set is the union of all justifications. That is, the concept of necessity relies on the concept of justification. In particular, the connection axiom (t : ϕ) → ϕ of logic S4LP [6] is satisfied. If a justification is a set of propositions, then it seems to be natural to read the symbol : as "is element of" in the same way as in formulas ϕ : true or ϕ : f alse. Therefore, we write ϕ : t instead of t : ϕ. 4 ϕ : t reads as "the proposition denoted by ϕ is an element of the justification denoted by t". Shorter: "ϕ belongs to t" or simply "ϕ is t" if we consider a justification t as a property of propositions. This seems to be in accordance with the ontological view presented in a recent article of Artemov [4] where justifications are regarded as sets of sentences. 5 Justifications can be ordered by inclusion. We express this by formulas of the form s ≤ t. We deal with propositional quantifiers ∀x, ∃x as in [14] . In the present paper, we introduce justification quantifiers u ("for all justifications u ...") and u ("there is an justification u ..."). To this end, our models have an additional universe consisting of elements called indexes which are in one-to-one correspondence with those subsets of the propositional universe which are justifi- 3 In order to deal with a global predicate such as validity, the non-Fregean logic developed in [13] has necessarily the property that an equation ϕ ≡ ψ is true in a model iff it is true in all models. This implies that we can identify a proposition with the same set of formulas in every model. Hence, it makes sense to speak of "valid propositions". 4 We hope not to annoy people working in the area of Justification Logic with this change of notation in this paper. We tried to use a mix of both notations: t : ϕ and ϕ : true which results in formulas such as t : (ϕ : true). This seems to be not really satisfactory. 5 Our interpretation of justifications as sets of true propositions derives directly from the semantic approach presented in [12] (where knowledge is given as a set of true propositions) and from axioms of basic Justification Logic independently from [4] . Connections between some properties of our non-Fregean semantics and the notion of modular model given in [4] remain to be further investigated. We observe here that the inclusions in condition (2) [section 3, [4] ] correspond in some sense to the equations of the homomorphism property of our Gamma-function:
, where · Λ and + Λ are operations of an algebra Λ of (names of) justifications. cations. The justification quantifiers then range over the universe of indexes which can be seen as (unique) names for justifications. This enables us to formulate our key axiom: ϕ ↔ u.(ϕ : u) which reads as "ϕ is necessarily true iff there exists a justification for ϕ". Necessity is a property of propositions which is first-order definable by means of justifications: consider the term {x | u.(x : u)}, where x is a propositional variable and u is a variable for justifications.
Finally, we study extensions of our deductive system and of our semantics by some modal logic principles. We prove that our semantics is strong enough to restore the modal logics S4 and S5. These results can be proved independently from Justification Logic (instead of the axiom of application work with the axiom K of modal logic). That is, we are able to establish a non-Fregean semantics of a logic that contains the modal system S4 (or S5).
We refer to the class of logics developed in this paper as ∈ J -Logic (Epsilon-J-Logic). J stands for "justification", and the symbol ∈ refers to the fact that we read a formula ϕ : t as "ϕ is element of justification t". 6 
Syntax
∈ J -Logic extends the first-order non-Fregean logic studied in [14] , which in turn is an extension of ∈ T -Logic [17, 18] . We have now two sorts of variables. V P = {x 0 , x 1 , ...} is the well-ordered set of propositional variables, V J = {v 0 , v 1 , ...} is the well-ordered set of justification variables. We refer to propositional variables as x, y, z, x 1 , ... and to justification variables as u, v, u 1 , .... V := V P ∪ V J is the set of all variables. C is a set of constant symbols for justifications and D is a set of constant symbols for propositions. All these sets are pairwise disjoint. If there is no risk of confusion we may refer to the elements of V ∪ C ∪ D as x, y, x 1 , ... without distinction of the actual sort of the element. The existential quantifiers ∃x and u are definable by means of the universal quantifiers in the usual way. We use ♦ϕ as an abbreviation for the formula ¬ ¬ϕ. Besides propositional identity expressed by the identity connective ≡ coming from basic non-Fregean logic we have an additional identity for justifications for which we use the same symbol: s ≡ t reads as "the justification terms s and t denote the same justification". We have a connective < for propositional reference introduced and studied in [10, 11, 14] . ϕ < ψ reads as "the proposition denoted by ψ says something about (refers to) the proposition denoted by ϕ". We introduce a relation symbol ≤ for a partial ordering on justifications. The formula s ≤ t reads as "justification s is contained in justification t" or "justification s is stronger than justification t". The predicates for truth and falsity come from ∈ T -Logic [17] and are already discussed in the introductory section. 7 Definition 2.1 Let C, D be disjoint sets of constant symbols.
• The set of justification terms T m(C) is the smallest set that contains V J ∪ C and is closed under the following condition. If s, t ∈ F m(C), then (s · t), (s + t) ∈ T m(C).
• The set of formulas F m(C, D) is the smallest set that contains V P ∪D and is closed under the following condition.
Let ϕ ∈ F m(C, D). Notions such as subformula of ϕ and free variables of ϕ are defined in the usual way. ψ is a proper subformula of ϕ if ψ is a subformula of ϕ and ψ = ϕ. We denote the set of all free propositional variables of ϕ by f var P (ϕ), the set of all free justification variables of ϕ by f var J (ϕ). We put f var(ϕ) := f var P (ϕ) ∪ f var J (ϕ). con P (ϕ), con J (ϕ) is the set of all propositional constants, of all justification constants, occurring in ϕ, respectively. By f con(ϕ) we denote the set of all free variables and all constant symbols occurring in ϕ. If t ∈ T m(C), then var(t), con(t), is the set of variables, constant symbols occurring in ϕ, respectively. We put varcon(t) := var(t) ∪ con(t).
According to Definition 2.1, if ϕ is a formula with x, u / ∈ f var(ϕ), then also ∀x.ϕ and u.ϕ are formulas, for example, ∀x.d, ∀x.(y → z), u.(v ≤ v). Such formulas do not express meaningful propositions and are therefore undesired. Let us call a formula ϕ proper if it has the following property: if ψ is a subformula of ϕ of the form ∀x.ψ ′ or u.ψ ′ , then x ∈ f var P (ψ ′ ), u ∈ f var J (ψ ′ ), respectively. It is possible to modify and to extend Definition 2.1 in such a way that F m(C, D) contains exactly the proper formulas (see [14] ). So we will assume in the following that F m(C, D) is the set of all proper formulas. That is, if we consider formulas ∀x.ϕ or u.ψ, then we always assume that x ∈ f var P (ϕ), u ∈ f var J (ψ). Given the notion of free variables, it is clear that the set of proper formulas can be defined inductively and we therefore may carry out proofs by induction on the construction of (proper) formulas.
Definition 2.2 A substitution is a function
If σ is a substitution, x 0 , ..., x n ∈ V P ∪V J ∪C ∪D and e 0 , ..., e n ∈ F orm(C, D)∪T m(C) such that x i is a formula iff e i is a formula (equivalently: x i is a term iff e i is a term), then σ[x 0 := e 0 , ..., x n := e n ] is the substitution τ defined as follows:
The identity substitution x → x is denoted by ε. Instead of ε[x 0 := e 0 , ..., x n := e n ] we write [x 0 := e 0 , ..., x n := e n ]. A substitution σ extends in the canonical way to a function
where v is the least variable of V J greater than all elements of {f var J (σ(w)) | w ∈ f con( u.ϕ)}, and y is the least variable of V P greater than all elements of {f var P (σ(w)) | w ∈ f con( u.ϕ)}. We say that the variable v (the variable y) is forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. u.ϕ (w.r.t. ∀x.ϕ).
The composition of two substitutions σ and τ is the substitution σ • τ defined by x → σ(z) [τ ] . The following Lemma collects some useful properties of substitutions.
Lemma 2.3 (Properties of substitutions)
Let ϕ ∈ F m(C, D), t ∈ T m(C), and let σ, τ, ̺ be substitutions. Then
• The variable y ∈ V P forced by σ w.r.t. ∀x.ψ is the least element of V P greater than all elements of f var
Definition 2.4
The alpha-congruence = α is the smallest equivalence relation on F orm(C, D) satisfying the following conditions.
• ϕ 1 = α ψ 1 and ϕ 2 = α ψ 2 implies ϕ 1 * ϕ 2 = α ψ 1 * ψ 2 , where * ∈ {→, ≡, <}
• If ∀x.ϕ and ∀y.ψ are formulas such that ϕ = α ψ[y := x], and y = x implies x / ∈ f var(ψ), then ∀x.ϕ = α ∀y.ψ.
Two formulas are alpha-congruent iff they differ at most on their bound variables. Applying the identity substitution ε to a formula ϕ results in general in a renaming of bound variables. ϕ[ε] is in a certain normal form, we say that it is normalized. It holds that ϕ[ε] = α ϕ, and furthermore ϕ = α ψ iff ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε] (see [14] for proofs and more details). Our definition of semantics will ensure that two alpha-congruent formulas always denote the same proposition. From [10, 14] we adopt a further syntactical relation ≺ on the set of formulas. ϕ ≺ ψ will capture the intuitive notion of "formula ψ says something about formula ϕ" or "formula ψ refers to formula ϕ".
ϕ ≺ ψ implies that ϕ is alpha-congruent to a proper subformula of ψ. In a quantifier-free language the converse would be true, too. However,
In the latter case, the formula x → d says something about formula x, namely that formula x implies formula d. In the former case, however, the formula ∀x.(x → d) does not say anything about the formula x.
A syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ can never be a self-reference since no formula is a proper subformula of itself: ϕ ≺ ϕ is impossible. There are no self-referential formulas. Self-reference must be shifted to the semantic level where it is represented by the semantic reference relation < M on the propositional universe of a model M. Our model definition ensures that syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ implies semantic reference between the respectively denoted propositions. This can be expressed by ϕ < ψ. If ϕ ≺ ψ and the formula ϕ ≡ ψ is true in a given model, then the formula ϕ < ϕ is also true in the model. Thus, ϕ denotes a self-referential proposition. A typical example is the equation d ≡ (d : true) asserting a truth teller. Constructions of models that contain specific self-referential propositions are developed in [11, 12] . For these constructions, however, we worked with a quantifier-free language. Constructions of infinite standard models for a first-order language are difficult because of the impredicativity of quantifiers (see [14] ). A standard model M is a model where every proposition is denoted by a sentence (i.e., there are no non-standard elements) and for any two formulas ϕ, ψ and any assignment γ, (M, γ) ϕ < ψ implies the existence of formulas ϕ ′ and [14] ). Standard models are the intended models. All models constructed in this article are standard models. The existence of non-standard models is the prize that we have to pay for the existence of a complete calculus. In [14] we constructed a canonical model M, i.e. a model without non-standard elements and with the following property: M ϕ < ψ ⇔ ϕ ≺ ψ. A canonical model is a standard model which satisfies only the trivial equations between sentences, i.e. equations between alpha-congruent sentences. One can modify the construction given in [14] in such a way that the resulting standard model satisfies specific non-trivial equations. In this way, one gets standard models that contain specific self-referential propositions.
We skip the proofs of the following useful facts.
Lemma 2.7 The syntactical reference ≺ is a transitive relation on F m(C, D).
Before we present our set of axioms we introduce the following notation. Let
be substitutions, and suppose f var(ϕ) = {x 1 , ..., x n } and var(t) = {u 1 , ..., u m }. Then we abbreviate the formula (σ(
by the notation σ ≡ ϕ σ ′ which can be informally read as "σ and σ ′ coincide on all free variables of ϕ". Similarly, we write σ ≡ t σ ′ for the formula 9 Note that var(t) contains only justification variables whereas f var(ϕ) can contain justification variables as well as propositional variables.
Definition 2.8 The set Ax of axioms is the smallest set containing a sufficient set of tautologies of classical propositional logic, all formulas of the form given in (i) -(xxiii) below, and being closed under the following two conditions:
• If ϕ ∈ Ax and u ∈ f var J (ϕ), then u.ϕ ∈ Ax.
• If ϕ ∈ Ax and x ∈ f var P (ϕ), then ∀x.ϕ ∈ Ax.
We consider the underlying orderings on VP and on VJ .
(viii) ϕ < ψ, whenever ϕ ≺ ψ (syntactical reference implies semantical reference)
the smallest set of formulas containing Φ ∪ Ax and being closed under the rule of Modus Ponens: If
The notions of derivation, consistent set, inconsistent set, maximally consistent set are defined in the usual way.
Notice that the axioms (xiii) and (xvii) derive from (xiv) and (xviii) together with propositional logic. The system Ax is rather weak. No formula of the form ϕ : t or ϕ is a theorem. This will change when we add the rule of Axiom Necessitation in section 5. We will show that adding this rule together with the schema ϕ → ϕ will imply the modal logic principle of Necessitation (Theorem 5.5).
It is not hard to check that our deductive system extends Suszko's basic nonFregean logic SCI, the Sentential Calculus with Identity, (see, e.g., [7] ). For instance, the axiom (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ) of SCI can be obtained as follows:
= ψ] be substitutions and let χ be the formula ¬x.
is an instance of (xii), i.e. an element of Ax. But this notation is an abbreviation of the formula (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ).
Our deductive system differs in some essential aspects from the axiomatization of (the weaker) first-order ∈ T -Logic presented in [18] . For instance, we deal with substitutions in a different way and -inspired by the Hilbert-style calculus for classical first-order logic given in [16] -we work without a Generalization Rule.
Semantics
Our notion of model extends the definition presented in [14] . Instead of defining algebraic models in the style of Bloom/Suszko [7] we prefer to work with an (equivalent) ∈ T -style semantics which in its essence goes back to Sträter [17] and Zeitz [18] . We add some algebraic structure in order to deal with justifications.
is given by the following: • M , T RU E, F ALSE, N ECESSARY , REASON l , for each l ∈ L, are sets of propositions such that the following conditions are satisfied: is the assignment that maps x to m and variables y ∈ V {x} to γ(y). The assignment γ l u , where u ∈ V J and l ∈ L, is defined similarly.
The Gamma-function satisfies the following structure conditions:
• For all x ∈ V = V P ∪V J and all assignments γ:
(Homomorphism Property (HP))
The Gamma-function satisfies the following truth conditions. For all assignments γ : V → M ∪ L, for all formulas ϕ, ψ, and for all justification terms s, t:
10 If f var(ϕ) = ∅, then (CP) justifies to write Γ (ϕ) instead of Γ (ϕ, γ). Let M be a model and γ be an assignment. The set
interpretation that satisfies a formula (a set of formulas) is called a model of that formula (of that set of formulas). The class of all interpretations that satisfy a set
is closed under Modus Ponens (because of truth condition (xi), see the proof of Theorem 5.8) but in general it does not contain the axioms of Ax. So it is in general not closed under logical consequence. This will change when we introduce the rule (and the corresponding truth condition) of Axiom Necessitation ensuring that F N contains all axioms of Ax.
The structure conditions of a model guarantee the following Substitution Principles. 
The second Substitution Principle follows similarly.
It is now straightforward to show that all axioms are valid.
Stronger than Substitution Principle 1 is item (i) of the following Substitution Lemma. Several versions of this Lemma were already proved in [18, 17] . The proof given in [Lemma 3.14, [11] ] relies on ideas due to Zeitz [18] and can easily be adapted to ∈ J -Logic.
Lemma 3.4 (Substitution Lemma) Let M be a model, ϕ ∈ F m(C, D).
(i) If σ, σ ′ are substitutions and γ,
is an assignment and σ is a substitution such that
Item (ii) provides a condition such that the (SP) also holds for certain substitutions which are not necessarily restricted to the domain of variables. Item (i) implies a third Substitution Principle which we will apply to show that the following sets are well defined. Let M be a model. We define:
Suppose β is an assignment and ψ is a formula such that Γ (ψ, β) = p ∈ P OSSIBLE. By definition of P OSSIBLE, there is a formula ϕ and an assignment γ such that Γ (ϕ, γ) = p and Γ (¬ϕ, γ) / ∈ N ECESSARY . We define two substitutions σ = [x := ϕ] and
Hence, P OSSIBLE is well defined. Similarly, one shows that IM P OSSIBLE is well defined.
The next fact follows readily from the definitions. 
Note that the set F ALSE is definable, too: F ALSE = {Γ (ϕ, γ) | Γ (¬ϕ, γ) ∈ T RU E, for some ϕ, γ}. In fact, formulas of the form ϕ : f alse and ¬ϕ are logically equivalent and we could do without the operator : f alse. However, in this intensional setting ¬ϕ and ϕ : f alse express different intensions and denote in general different propositions.
As already pointed out above, we expect that any two alpha-congruent formulas denote the same proposition. This is actually the case as the following Lemma shows. We adopt the proof from [14] .
Lemma 3.6 (Alpha Property (αP )) Let M be a model. For all formulas ϕ, ψ and all assignments
Proof. Suppose ϕ = α ψ. Recall that this is equivalent with the condition ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε], where ε is the identity substitution (see [14] ). It holds that γ = γε, for any assignment
The Completeness Theorem
In order to prove that our deductive system is complete with respect to the defined semantics we follow the usual strategy. We define a suitable notion of Henkin set, show that every Henkin set has a model, and finally show that every consistent set extends to a Henkin set. Of course, this establishes in particular soundness of a certain subset of Ax with respect to the semantics of the particular (and less expressive) ∈ T -logic presented in [14] . . The last formula is clearly an axiom of the form (xiv). Note that w = u since w / ∈ var(ϕ). The same argument can also be applied in the other cases that involve quantifiers. The quantifier-free cases follow straightforwardly.
Lemma 4.2 If
Proof. The proof is an induction on the length n ≥ 1 of a derivation Φ ⊢ ϕ. If n = 1, then ϕ must be an axiom (note that ϕ ∈ Φ is impossible because c ∈ con(ϕ) does not occur in Φ). By In our treatment of Henkin set (Definitions 4.3 and 4.4, and Lemma 4.5 below) we follow some notation and techniques given in W. Rautenberg's logic book [16] .
Definition 4.3 A set Φ ⊆ F m(C, D) is called a Henkin set if
• Φ is maximally consistent
Definition 4.4 Suppose we are given the language F m(C, D).
• To each pair ϕ, u, where ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) and u ∈ f var J (ϕ), we assign exactly one new justification constant c ϕ,u / ∈ C and define
• To each pair ϕ, x, where ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) and x ∈ f var P (ϕ), we assign exactly one new propositional constant d ϕ,x / ∈ D and define
Note that ¬(ϕ u ) can be written as u.¬ϕ → ¬ϕ[u := c ϕ,u ]. In this sense, the new constant symbol c ϕ,u is a witness for the truth of u.¬ϕ. Similarly, c ϕ,x can be seen as a witness for the truth of ∃x.¬ϕ. 
Lemma 4.5 If
Φ ⊆ F m(C, D) is consistent, then Φ ∪ X(C, D) ⊆ F m(C ′ , D) and Φ ∪ Y (C, D) ⊆ F m(C, D ′ ) are consistent,
Proof. Suppose
We may assume that n is minimal with this property. Let u := u n , ϕ := ϕ n , c := c n,ϕ , Φ ′ := Φ ∪ {¬(ϕ 
Of course, these equivalence relations rely on the given set Φ. It will be clear from the context on which maximally consistent set these relations are based.
Lemma 4.7 If Φ ⊆ F m(C, D) is maximally consistent, then: (i) ≈ T is an equivalence relation on T m(C).
(ii) ≈ F is an equivalence relation on F m(C, D), containing alpha-congruence.
Proof. 
The second assertion of (iii) follows similarly. Now suppose ϕ ≈ F ϕ ′ and ψ ≈ F ψ ′ . Let x ∈ V P var P (ψ ′ ) and y ∈ V P var P (ϕ).
(iv) follows in a similar way as (iii). (v) follows from axiom (xi) and symmetry of ≈ F .
Theorem 4.8 Every Henkin set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ F m(C, D) be a Henkin set. We consider the equivalence relations ≈ F and ≈ T w.r.t. to the maximally consistent set Φ. Let ϕ be the equivalence class of ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) modulo ≈ F , and let s be the equivalence class of
Since Φ is a Henkin set, Φ ¬(c ≡ t) for some c ∈ C. By maximally consistency of Φ, Φ ⊢ c ≡ t. Similarly for the second assertion. This proves Claim 1. The ingredients of our model are now given as follows:
It will be helpful to have in mind that equivalence classes ϕ, s can be represented by d, c, for some d ∈ D, c ∈ C, respectively. By Lemma 4.7, all the above sets and operations are well-defined. Claim 2: N ECESSARY = s∈L REASON s , and the map s → REASON s is an order-isomorphism from (L,
Since Φ is a Henkin set, it follows that Φ ⊢ u.¬(ϕ : u). This contradiction shows that ϕ ∈ c∈C REASON c . From the axioms (xxi) and (xviii) and the fact that Φ is a Henkin set it easily follows that
It remains to show that the map s → REASON s is injective. Suppose
This finishes the proof of the Claim.
is both a substitution and an assignment. As the last ingredient of our model we define the Gamma-function by
Thus, it is enough to show that
Let x ∈ f var(ϕ). Then on the one hand
And on the other hand,
for each x ∈ f var(ϕ). Axiom (xii) yields the first assertion. The second assertion follows analogously using axiom (xii). Thus, (SP) holds. Let ϕ, ψ be formulas such that ϕ ≺ ψ. By Lemma 2.6,
, and (RP) holds. Claim 4: The Gamma-function satisfies the truth conditions. Proof of the Claim:
It remains to show that the equivalences (*) and (**) hold. (*): v is the variable forced by the substitution τ γ w.r.t.
. Then it is clear that the equivalence (*) holds. (**): Let z ∈ f var(ϕ). First, we suppose z = u.
]. Item (v) of Lemma 4.7 yields the equivalence (**).
The condition concerning the propositional quantifier follows analogously. Finally,
The remaining truth conditions follow easily from axioms of propositional logic. Consider now the specific assignment
Proof of the Claim: From the definition of the assignment/substitution τ β it follows that Φ ⊢ τ β (x) ≡ ε(x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ), where ε is the identity substitution.
The Claim now follows from axiom (xii).
We have shown that
is a model. It follows now from Claim 5 and item (v) of Lemma 4.7 that the interpretation (M, β) is a model of the Henkin set Φ:
Theorem 4.9 Every consistent set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ F m(C, D) be consistent. We show that Φ extends to a Henkin set Φ * in an appropriate extended language F m(C * , D * ). By Theorem 4.8, Φ * has a model. We will see that its reduct to the sublanguage F m(C, D) is a model of Φ.
according to the notation of Definition 4.4. By Lemma 4.5,
). Finally, we put 
That is, Φ * ⊢ ϕ u . This is a contradiction to Φ * ⊢ ¬(ϕ u ) and the consistency of Φ * . Therefore, Φ * ⊢ u.ϕ. We have shown that Φ * has the properties of a Henkin set.
Let (M * , β) be a model of Φ * w.r.t. the language F m(C * , D * ), and let Γ * be the Gamma-function of M * . Let Γ be the restriction of Γ * to the domain 
Proof. The direction from right to left follows from the fact that all axioms are valid and that the rule of Modus Ponens is sound. Let Φ ϕ. Suppose Φ ϕ. From axioms of classical propositional logic it follows that Φ ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. By the preceding results, this set has a model. This is a contradiction to Φ ϕ.
Capturing the modal logics S4 and S5
In this last section we discuss some extensions of our original deductive system. In particular, we will show that adding the following axiom schema (4) and the rule of Axiom Necessitation (see below) results in a system that is able to restore modal logic S4. The condition that formulas of the form (4) are theorems seems to be essential for capturing modal logics by our semantics. We are unable to restore weaker modal logics such as T or K not containing (4) . Axiom schema (4) is given by all formulas of the form ϕ → ϕ
In standard modal logic this schema stands for S 4 . We denote the system that we get by adding (4) to our system Ax (together with Modus Ponens) by Ax+(4). Let ⊢ (4) be the resulting relation of derivability. The new axiom schema corresponds to the following new truth condition (4) of a model M:
for all ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) and for all assignments γ : V → M . Let (4) be the consequence relation of the logic generated by all models that satisfy the additional truth condition (4).
Corollary 5.1 For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F m(C, D):
Proof. One easily checks that ϕ → ϕ is valid in all models with truth condition (4). Towards completeness we follow exactly the same strategy as above. It is sufficient to show that the model of Φ constructed in Theorem 4.8 (where Φ is now a Henkin set w.r.t. the system Ax + (4)) satisifies the new truth condition (4):
Recall that the following axiom schema (E) stands for the modal logic S 5 : ♦ϕ → ♦ϕ. Adding all formulas of this form as axioms to our system Ax results in a system that we denote by Ax + (E). Axiom schema (E) corresponds to the following new truth condition (E) of a model M:
for all ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) and for all assignments γ : V → M . Let ⊢ (E) be the derivability relation of system Ax + (E), and let (E) be the consequence relation of the logic generated by all models that satisfy the truth condition (E). Then in a similar way as above one proves Corollary 5.2 For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F m(C, D):
is not an axiom of our systems but it is a valid (i.e., true in all models) and therefore derivable from Ax, i.e. a theorem. This is shown in detail in the proof of Theorem 5.8 below.
A further essential ingredient of current modal logics is the rule of Necessitation: from ϕ derive ϕ. In the following, we will show that the Necessitation rule can be restored by introducing a rule of Axiom Necessitation together with axiom schema (4). 
Proof. Let t, f, nec, imp be (names of) propositions, where t stands for true, f stands for false, nec stands for necessary, and imp stands for impossible. Put T RU E := {t, nec}, F ALSE := {f, imp} and N ECESSARY := {nec}. The propositional universe of our model is M := T RU E ∪ F ALSE and the reference relation is given by < M := M × M . Furthermore, we define L := {l}, l ≤ Λ l, l + Λ l := l, l · Λ l := l, and REASON l := {nec}, where l is any new symbol that will serve as a name for the (unique) justification {nec}. We define the Gamma-function inductively on the construction of formulas, simultaneously for all assignments γ : V → M :
(SP) holds. The remaining structure properties of a model are trivially satisfied. The truth conditions follow readily from the construction. From the definition of the Gamma-function in the case Γ ( ϕ, γ) it follows that the model also satisfies the truth conditions (4) and (AxNec). Now we define the assignment β :
Then one shows by induction on ϕ ∈ L that the following holds:
for every ϕ ∈ L.
It might be an interesting observation that the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.7 is in some sense a 4-valued model of a logic that extends the modal system S4. Now we prove the converse of Theorem 5.7. As above, we suppose that L is the language of propositional modal logic with V P = {x 0 , x 1 , ...} the set of propositional variables.
Theorem 5.8 Let M be a model satisfying the additional truth conditions (AxNec)
and (4) . Let β : V P → M be an assignment. Then there exists a frame (W, R) of modal logic S4, a truth value assignment g : W → (V P → {0, 1}), and a world w ∈ W such that for all ϕ ∈ L:
Proof. We will use some basic concepts of the theory of abstract logics (see, e.g., [15, 13] ). A classical abstract logic A = (Expr, T h, {, ∼ . , }) is given by a set of expressions or formulas Expr, a subset T h of the powerset of Expr such that for every non-empty T ⊆ T h, T ∈ T h, and a set of connectives { , , , ∼}. The elements of T h are called theories. Every theory is the intersection of a non-empty set of maximal theories (maximal w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion). The connectives satisfy the following properties. For all expressions a, b and all maximal theories T : a → b ∈ T ⇔ a / ∈ T or b ∈ T , ∼ a ∈ T ⇔ a / ∈ T , a b ∈ T ⇔ a ∈ T or b ∈ T , a b ∈ T ⇔ a ∈ T and b ∈ T . Note that T h ∪ {Expr} is a closure system. The corresponding closure operator is the consequence relation of logic A which is required to be compact. A set B of expressions is said to be consistent in A if B is contained in some theory. It follows that a set T of expressions is a theory iff T is consistent and closed under the consequence relation. Note that Expr is not a theory.
Obviously, the class of all models of ∈ J -Logic generates a classical abstract logic A. In fact, the set of formulas satisfied by a model is a maximal theory. The compactness of the consequence relation follows from our completeness theorem. The set of formulas F M := {ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) | Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ T RU E} = {ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) | (M, β) ϕ} is a maximal theory, and F N := {ϕ ∈ F m(C, D) | Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ N ECESSARY } ⊆ F M is therefore a consistent set in the sense of the abstract logic A. Claim 1: F N is a theory in the sense of the classical abstract logic A, i.e. F N is the intersection of a non-empty set of maximal theories. Proof of the Claim: Since a set B is a theory iff B is consistent and deductively closed, it remains to show that F N is deductively closed, i.e. F N ϕ implies ϕ ∈ F N . Recall that coincides with the closure operator of the closure system associated with the classical abstract logic A. By our completeness theorem, it is enough to prove: F N ⊢ ϕ implies ϕ ∈ F N . We show this by induction on the length of a derivation. If this length is 1, then ϕ ∈ F N or ϕ is an axiom. We may assume that ϕ is an axiom. Truth condition (AxNec) implies ϕ ∈ F N . If the length of the derivation is greater than 1, then there are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ such that N F ⊢ ψ and N F ⊢ ψ → ϕ. By induction hypothesis, ψ, ψ → ϕ ∈ F N . That is, Γ (ψ, β) ∈ N ECESSARY and Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ N ECESSARY . There are indexes l, k such that Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ REASON k and Γ (ψ, β) ∈ REASON l . Let u, v ∈ V J (f var J (ϕ) ∪ f var J (ψ)), and let β ′ be an assignment that coincides with β on f var(ϕ) ∪ f var(ψ), and β ′ (u) = k and β ′ (v) = l. Then by (CP), Γ (ψ → ϕ, β ′ ) = Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ REASON Γ (u,β ′ ) = REASON k and Γ (ψ, β ′ ) = Γ (ψ, β) ∈ REASON Γ (v,β ′ ) = REASON l . By truth condition (xi) and (HP) of a model, Γ (ϕ, β) = Γ (ϕ, β ′ ) ∈ REASON Γ (u·v,β ′ ) = REASON Γ (u,β ′ )· Λ Γ (v,β ′ ) = REASON k· Λ l ⊆ N ECESSARY . Then ϕ ∈ F N and F N is deductively closed. This proves the Claim. 11 Since F N is a theory, there are maximal theories (T i ) i∈I , T i ⊆ F m(C, D), such that F N = i∈I T i . Observe that (M, β) ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ F N ⇔ ϕ ∈ T i for all i ∈ I. For each i ∈ I we define an extensional model M i as follows. Let t, f, l be new symbols. We define M i := {t, f }, L i := {l}, REASON i l := T RU E i := {t}, F ALSE i := {f }, N ECESSARY i := T RU E i , < i := M i × M i . The symbols + and · are again interpreted as the trivial, idempotent operations on L i . The Gamma-function is defined simultaneously for all assignments γ : Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.7 one shows that M i satisfies all properties of a model. We now consider the specific assignments ̺ i : V P ∪ V J → M i ∪ L i defined as follows: diately implies that axiom K, (ψ → ϕ) → ( ψ → ϕ), is valid and therefore a theorem in ∈J -Logic. We have already used this fact before. ̺ i (x) :=    t, if x ∈ T i for x ∈ V P f, if x / ∈ T i for x ∈ V P l, if x ∈ V J (w * , g) ψ ⇔ (w * , g) ψ and (w i , g) ψ for all i ∈ I ⇔ ψ ∈ w * and ψ ∈ w i for all i ∈ I, by induction hypothesis
It is clear that (W, R) is a frame of modal logic S4. It remains to prove the following Claim 4: For all ϕ ∈ L:
(M, β) ϕ ⇔ (w * , g) ϕ.
Proof of the Claim: This is again an induction on ϕ ∈ L. We show the case ϕ = ψ: (M, β) ψ ⇔ Γ ( ψ, β) ∈ T RU E ⇔ ψ ∈ F M ⇔ (w * , g) ψ, by Claim 3. Thus, Claim 4 is true. This finishes the proof of the theorem.
